Ensuring multimedia content security is one of the main targets to solve multimedia information security problems and k-anonymous model is a classic and effective model to protect personal information when we publish multimedia data. The k-anonymous security with different k values has always been a hot topic of research, and there is no specific quantitative method for k-anonymous model security without considering any application scenarios or assumptions. In this paper, we give a quantitative method for the capability of attacker and defender under k-anonymous model. More specifically, we present a new general notion of limitation to provide a precise bound of attack and defense capability in a k-anonymous model. Firstly, we establish the attack channel and the defense channel from the point of the attacker's and the defender's view respectively. Moreover, we describe the capability of both attacking and defending sides by introducing the average mutual information, as well as the maximum value of the the average mutual information is the limitation of the capability of both sides, i.e. the channel capacity. Finally, according to the variation curve of the average mutual information amount, we compare the capability of the attacker and defender and analyze the effect of k value on it and get the best interval of k, that is, the value of k should be greater than 8 and less than 40.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of information technology and the application of multimedia, the types and quantities of data in all walks of life are increasing exponentially. And multimedia has many data types and large amount of data. The application of multimedia makes people realize the value of data and the importance of open data sharing. However, data
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dalei Wu . sharing also brings about the problem of personal information security. So de-identification operations are performed before data is published. Current the main data privacy protection technologies are k-anonymous model [1] , differential privacy model [2] and so on. The k-anonymous minimizes the disclosure of personal privacy by de-identifying and generalizing identifier attribute values.
At present, the security of k-anonymous is also a hot topic but there is no specific quantitative method for k-anonymous model security and the research of VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ k-anonymous is mainly focused on two aspects: algorithm optimization and k-anonymous applications. But how to select a valid k value is another key point of k-anonymous research. Because if the value of k is too small, it is difficult to hide information, and if the value of k is too large, the distortion of data will be serious. So choosing the value of k is very important for the practical application of k-anonymous. And the purpose of this paper is to give a quantitative method for the capability of attacker and defender under k-anonymous model. In this paper, according to information theory, the attack and defense is regarded as the sender of communication, and an information receiver is constructed for them respectively, so we simulate the attack or defense process as a whole communication process. The successful transmission of 1 bit in the attack channel means that the attacker has successfully attacked once, and the successful transmission of 1 bit in the defense channel means that the defender has successfully defended once [3] , [4] . Then, we describe the limitation of the capability of the attacking and defending sides by the channel capacity and analyze the effect of the change of k value on the capability of both attack and defense. The security analysis of k-anonymous model is realized by comparing capability of attack and defense. We summarize our contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We give a method to measure the capability of attack and defense in k-anonymous model and help us find a safe k value interval by establishing attack channel and defense channel.
• According to the general framework of the channel, we construct the attack and defense channels of information transmission and give the attack and defense capability limitation under k-anonymous by analyzing the channel capacity.
• Based on information theory, we transform the capability of the attack and defense in the k-anonymous model into average mutual information of attack and defense channels. And the capacity limitation is the maximum of average mutual information.
• This paper discusses the influence of k value on attack ability and defense ability, as well as we conclude that both attack and defense ability are determined by the k value of the defender. And considering the attacker's background, the value of k had better be 8 ≤ k ≤ 40. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II is the related work and Section III of this paper introduces the relevant background knowledge about k-anonymous and information theory. In Section IV, we construct attack model and defensive model, and deduce the capability and their capability limitations of both sides under the k-anonymous model according to the relevant knowledge of the general theory of security in section III. In Section V, we conduct the experiment research, analysis the simulation result, obtain the optimal k value interval. In Section VI, we discuss our findings and point out the applicability of this method. Finally, section VII gives a conclusion and present the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Traditional multimedia security mainly studies the optimization and development of its technology. Encryption scheme, privacy protection model, security protocols, sharing scheme and other security technology have been the focus of multimedia research [5] - [7] . In 2018, Naseer et al. [8] proposed a new image encryption technique based on 3D mixed chaotic map, which can meet the security requirements of image transmission. In 2019, Velliangiri [9] used the encryption module based on compression to improve the security of multimedia video, compared with the existing methods, the video security framework has better performance. Xu et al. [10] proposed a cipher based solution digital signal processor (CDSP) is a dedicated instruction extension based on digital signal processor platform to provide programming flexibility and performance, solving the multimedia data/information privacy and security issues in the field of Internet of things. To cope with the increasing demand for video on mobile devices, which poses a major challenge to the existing cellular network infrastructure, Wu et al. [11] proposed a user-centered video transmission system for device-to-device (D2D) communication. The proposed solution achieves QoE-guaranteed video streaming service in a cellular network.
In other research applications of multimedia. In order to solve the challenge of reducing energy and storage space consumption in line multimedia sensor network (WMSNs), Xu et al. [12] proposed a wifi-based low duty cycle WMSN (LWMSN), and evaluated its design through simulation and experiment. The results show that the accuracy of the method is more than percent on average and energy and storage space consumption were reduced by 53 and 40 percent, respectively. Li and Ge [13] proposed a parallel chaotic hash function of cryptography based on cross-coupled mapping lattice to solve the problem of multimedia communication security. The performance of the hash function is evaluated from the aspects of the uniform distribution of hash value, the sensitivity of hash value to the slight change of the original message, the key and image, the confusion and diffusion characteristics, the collision test, and the efficiency of computation speed. The results show that the statistical performance of this algorithm is better than the existing chaotic hash function, and it is suitable for multimedia communication security. Wu et al. [14] , [15] use the RBP-BP hybrid neural network to propose an anomaly event detection method for Internet media and a new natural inspired wireless resource allocation scheme for Internet media with slicing feature perception.
The k-anonymous [1] as an important multimedia information security technology is proposed by Samarati and Seweney, at the ACM on principles of database systems (PODS) International Conference in 1998. In 2004, Meyerson and Williams [16] pointed out that even if only individual units in the table were hidden, the best anonymous k-anonymity could be guaranteed to be a complete problem of NP (Nondeterministic Polynomial). In 2009, Zhong et al. [17] proposed k-anonymous data collection, their method had the advantages of anonymity-preserving data collection and privacy enhancing k-anonymous, and they given rigorous proofs for the correctness and privacy of his protocol, and experimental results showed its efficiency. Wong et al. [18] proposed an (α, k)-anonymity model, which protected both identifications and relationships to sensitive information in data and proved that the optimal (α, k)anonymity problem is NP-hard problem. Song et al. [19] , based on the relationship between k values that meet privacy protection and data quality requirements, an optimal selection algorithm for k value is presented.
In the application of k-anonymous, Gruteser and Grunwald [20] introduced the idea of k-anonymous technology into the location service LBS to ensure the location privacy of the user while enjoying the LBS service. Casino et al. [21] proposed a new technique for privacy preserving collaborative filtering (PPCF) based on microaggregation, which provides accurate recommendations estimated from perturbed data whilst guaranteeing user k-anonymous. Reference [22] proposed a mechanism based on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) to divide user locations into groups of at least k users. This mechanism can be both local and k-anonymous. The mechanism is shown to preserve both locality and k-anonymous. Liu et al. [23] proposed a new method generate more reliable anonymous data and reduce the information loss rate, which combined priority weight-adjusted method, mean difference recommending tree method (MDR tree method) and k-anonymous. Song et al. [24] proposed a privacy protection protocol based on k-anonymous false packet injection (KAFP). The protocol randomly generates k false receiver nodes, and increases the security time by hiding the location of the receiver nodes.
In the optimization of k-anonymous algorithm, David et al. [25] addressed the problem of k-anonymous microaggregation with preservation of statistical dependence in a formal systematic manner modeling statistical dependence as predictability of the confidential attributes from the perturbed quasi-identifiers. Shuo et al. [26] analyzed the improved l-diversity algorithm from the perspective of anonymous data privacy and security and experiments showed that the algorithm can protect the data in the smart grid. Hui et al. [27] proposed an enhanced privacy protection model and implemented the algorithm, combining the advantages of k-anonymous model and l-diversity model. The experimental results showed that the algorithm can reduce the risk of privacy leakage, and has a small loss of information. Liu et al. [28] proposed a novel grey maximum distance to average vector (GMDAV) for k-anonymous from the perspective of qusi-identifier attribute. The experimental results showed that GMDAV are all better than MDAV in the aspects of information loss and distance linked disclosure, and this method could effectively reduce the loss of information and reduce the overall information disclosure risk of the important attribute values. According to the above analysis, the research on k-anonymity mainly focuses on the optimization of the algorithm and the application of the model, and the selection of k value as an important part of k-anonymity has not received extensive attention. There is no method to measure k-anonymity security based on k values without considering any application scenarios or assumptions. In this paper, the measurement of k-anonymity security is implemented by comparing the abilities of attackers and defenders, so as to obtain a safe k value interval.
III. PRELIMINARY A. THE K -ANONYMOUS MODEL

Definition 1 (k-Anonymous):
The number of records corresponding to all quasi-identifiers in the data table is at least k, which ensures that any record in the published table is indistinguishable from other k − 1 records, so that the probability of identity authenticity is no more than 1 k [17] .
B. RELEVANT BASIS OF INFORMATION THEORY
Definition 2 (Communication Channel): It is a system that the output signal is probabilistic dependent on the input signal. Its characteristics are determined by a transfer probability matrix p (y|x), which gives the conditional probability distribution of the output of a given input [3] .
Definition 3 (Average Mutual Information): Another random variable leads to the reduction of uncertainty of the original random variable. Specifically, let X and Y are two random variables, then the reduction is average mutual information [3] , that is
Average mutual information I (X ; Y ) is also a measure of the degree of independence between two random variables, which is symmetric and nonnegative with respect to X and Y ; iff X and Y are independent, the average mutual information is zero.
Definition 4 (Channel Capacity): For the communication channel where the input signal is X and the output signal is Y , the channel capacity [3] C defined as
Theorem 1 (Shannon Channel Coding Theory): For discrete memoryless channels, all the bit rates smaller than channel capacity C are reachable, or it can be visually interpreted that all signals whose bit rates do not exceed channel capacity VOLUME 7, 2019 C can be transmitted from the sender to the receiver without error [4] .
C. RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE OF THE GENERAL THEORY OF INFORMATION SECURITY
Definition 5 (Self-Evaluation): Self-evaluation refers to a person's judgment of the success or failure of their own actions [29] .
Definition 6 (Blind Self-Evaluation): Blind evaluation means that neither side knows the evaluation of the other side but only knows its own evaluation, but this evaluation can not be evaluated by any third party [29] .
IV. CAPABILITY LIMITATION UNDER ATTACK AND DEFENCE MODEL OF K -ANONYMOUS
Assume that the attacker has a ''sincerely blind selfevaluation'' of his attack result after each attack, that is, when he thinks that this attack is successful, that will be recorded as X = 1; when he thinks he has failed, that will be recorded as X = 0.
It is also assumed that the defensive side has a ''sincerely blind self-evaluation'' of his defense result after each defense, that is, when he thinks that this defense is successful, that will be recorded as Y = 1; when he thinks he has failed, that will be recorded as Y = 0.
A two-dimensional random variable is obtained by recording the blind self-evaluation results of N times of attack and defense:
when N goes to infinity, the frequency tends to probability P s , so long as the attacking and defending sides are long enough to confront each other, the probability distributions of the random events X and Y , and the joint probability distribution (X , Y ) of can be obtained as follows:
According to the random events X and Y , we set up
then the probability distribution of Z is:
and
Since any two random events can form a communication channel, if X is the input and Z is the output, this constructs a communication channel R, which is called the attack channel. Similarly, if Y is the input and Z is the output, another communication channel T is constructed, which is called the defensive channel.
A. CAPABILITY LIMITATION OF ATTACKER UNDER K -ANONYMOUS MODEL
In attack channel, if the attack is successful, it is equivalent to the event {Z = 0, X = 0} or {Z = 1, X = 1} happened, that is channel R successfully transmits 1bit [34] . Therefore, we combine with Theorem 1: if the capacity of attack channel R is G, then for arbitrary transmission rate k n ≤ G, channel R successfully transmits k bits to the receiving end by code words that is longer than n bits in the case of any small probability of decoding error. Conversely, if channel R is able to transmit S bits without error to the receiving end in n bits code words, there must be S ≤ nG. Then we can get the Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Limitation Theorem of Attack Capability): Suppose the channel capacity of attack channel R composed of random event (X ; Z ) is G. If the attacker wants to really succeed in beating the defender m times, there must be some skill to enable him to achieve his goal with an arbitrary probability of approaching 1 in m/G attacks. Conversely, if an attacker passes through n attacks and gets S 1 really successful attacks, then there must be S 1 ≤ nG.
For communication system R, it is composed of random events X and Z , that is, it takes X as input and Z as output. And according to Theorem 2, channel capacity G of attack channel R is obtained, the attack capability limitation can be determined. We use the transition probability matrix A of order 2 * 2 to calculate the channel capacity G of attack channel R and the transition probability matrix A is:
Then, there is:
A(1, 0) = P s (Z = 0|X = 1) = P s (Z = 0, X = 1) P s (X = 1)
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Therefore, the transfer matrix of attack channel R formed by X and Z is as follows:
The joint probability distribution of the random event (X , Z ) is:
Therefore, the average mutual information between the random events X and Z is:
The channel capacity G of attack channel R with X as input and Z as output is equal to maxI (X , Z ). And the average mutual information change curve of attack channels is shown in Figure 2 .
According to Figure 2 and theorem 2, we see that the channel capacity G of attack channel R is determined by the value of k 2 , which increases with the decrease of k 2 and reaches the maximum value at k 2 = 2 and k 1 → ∞. 
B. CAPABILITY LIMITATION OF DEFENDER UNDER K -ANONYMOUS MODEL
In defensive channel, if the defender is successful, it is equivalent to the event {Z = 0, Y = 0} or {Z = 1, Y = 1} happened, that is channel T successfully transmits 1bit. Therefore, we combine with Theorem 1: if the capacity of attack channel T is F, then for arbitrary transmission rate k n ≤ G, channel T successfully transmits k bits to the receiving end by code words that is longer than n bits in the case of any small probability of decoding error. Conversely, if channel R is able to transmit S bits without error to the receiving end in n bits code words, there must be S ≤ nF. Then we can get the Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Limitation Theorem of Defender Capability): Suppose the channel capacity of defensive channel T composed of random event (X ; Z ) is F. If the defender wants to really succeed in beating the attacker m times, there must be some skill to enable him to achieve his goal with an arbitrary probability of approaching 1 in m/F attacks. Conversely, if an attacker passes through n attacks and gets S 2 really successful attacks, then there must be S 2 ≤ nF.
For communication system T , it is composed of random events Y and Z , that is, it takes Y as input and Z as output. And according to Theorem 3, channel capacity F of defensive channel T is obtained, the defender capability limitation can be determined. We use the transition probability matrix B of order 2 * 2 to calculate the channel capacity F of attack channel T and the transition probability matrix B is:
Therefore, the transfer matrix of attack channel R formed by Y and Z is as follows:
The joint probability distribution of the random event (Y , Z ) is:
The channel capacity F of defense channel T with Y as input and Z as output is equal to maxI (Y , Z ). And the average mutual information change curve of defensive channel is shown in Figure 3 .
According to Figure 3 and theorem 3, we see that the channel capacity F of defensive channel T is determined by the value of k 1 , which increases with the decrease of k 1 and reaches the maximum value at k 1 = 2 and k 2 → ∞.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
According to the Figure 2 and Figure 3 , we find that Figure 2 and Figure 3 are symmetric and where k 1 = k 2 , the average mutual information I (X , Z ) = I (Y , Z ) and the capability of attack and defense is equal; where k 1 < k 2 , the average mutual information I (X , Z ) < I (Y , Z ), which means that the attacker is in a weak position; where k 1 > k 2 , the average mutual information I (X , Z ) > I (Y , Z ) and defender is in a weak position.
But in the real world, it is impossible for an attacker to have k-anonymous data sheet that defenders have not yet published, i.e. k 1 < k 2 . That is to say if the defender does not publish the datasheet which datasheet's k is n, the attacker get n-anonymous data sheet without any knowledge background, which does not exist. So for the defense, defensive capability is only depends on his k, i.e. k 2 . There is that the k value of the data sheet published by the defender is great, the defensive capability is stronger. For the attack, we get when the defender publishes the datasheet which datasheet's k is 2, the attacker has the strongest attack capability, there is, when the defender publishes the 2-anonymous data sheet, the attacker can get the most information about the target object.
To sum up, we get that the k value of the defender determines the attack ability and defense ability, and where k = 2, the attack ability is the strongest. It also means that the defender is most disadvantaged. Next we need to determine the change in the ability of attackers and defenders when k is greater than 2. Figure 4 shows that the capability curve of attack and defense where k 1 = k 2 , we know that when k 1 = k 2 = 8, I (X , Z ) = I (Y , Z ) and the average mutual information I reaches the maximum. So in the Figure 5 , we let k 1 = 8 and observe the effect of k 2 on attackers and defenders. We see that where k 2 = 8, attack ability and defensive ability is equal; where k 2 < 8, attack ability is greater than defensive ability; where k 2 > 8, attack ability is less than defensive ability.
Based on the above analysis, in the Figure 6 , we choose the curve of the ability of attackers and defenders (i.e. the average mutual information) with the change of k 2 where k 1 = 50 in order to observe the trend of average mutual information. In this figure where k > 40, the capability of the attack and defense change slowly with the k value increasing. That means if k > 40, changes in k values do not have much impact on the security of k-anonymous. So based on the analysis in this paper, the best value of k is 8 ≤ k ≤ 40, and the higher the value of k, the defensive capability is stronger, this is, the higher the security of k-anonymous.
VI. DISCUSSION
This work mainly researches the security problem of k-anonymous based on the k value, which benefits from the function of average mutual information. It sets up attack channel and defensive channel respectively, and finds the limitations of attack ability and defensive ability, that is, the channel capacity of attack channel and defense channel. In the point k 1 = k 2 = 8, the attack ability and defensive ability is equal and reaches the maximum. It mains when the attacker can choose k, it is that if the attacker has background knowledge, the ability of the defender is always better than the ability of the attacker where k is 8 ≤ k ≤ 40. When the attacker has no background knowledge, if we use k-anonymous technology for multimedia information security, k value is best greater than 2 and less than 40. To sum up, the value of k had better be 8 ≤ k ≤ 40, regardless of whether the attacker has background knowledge or not.
We transform the security problem in the k-anonymous model into an attack and defense ability comparison problem and solve it through the average mutual information of attack and defense channels. The proposed method provides a simple solution to the security measurement problem of privacy protection, and is also applicable to other privacy protection technologies and models.
VII. CONCLUSION
Based on the general knowledge of the General Theory of Information Security, the key point of this paper is to treat the attack process of the attacker and the defense process of the defender as a communication model. We give a quantization method of the capability of the attacker and defender under the k-anonymous model by defining the source, the host and the channel, and introducing the concepts of average mutual information and channel capacity. Although this paper only gives the limitation model of the capability of attacker and defender under the k-anonymous model, it establishes a feasible system foundation to solve the problem of quantification of the security limitation of privacy protection. We believe that more complex privacy protection models, such as l-diversity model and differential privacy model, are feasible for further research, supported by the related achievements of information theory and the continuous deepening of related research.
